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JOB CHARACTERISTICS AND LABOR MARKET DISCRIMINATION 
IN PROMOTIONS: NEW THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
Abstract 
 
We present new theory and the first empirical test of promotion discrimination models 
based on job assignment signaling.  In our theory, promotions serve as signals of worker 
ability, and job hierarchies differ in the degree to which tasks vary across hierarchical 
levels.  When tasks differ substantially across levels, the opportunity cost (in terms of 
foregone output) of not promoting qualified workers from a disadvantaged group (e.g. 
racial minorities or females) is large, so employers are less likely to (inefficiently) retain 
such workers in lower-level jobs.  Thus, given performance in the pre-promotion job, the 
extent to which disadvantaged workers have lower promotion probabilities than 
advantaged workers should decrease when tasks vary more across hierarchical levels.  
Also, the difference between the favored and disfavored groups in the wage increase 
attached to promotion should diminish when tasks vary more across hierarchical levels.  
We test these implications empirically for the case of racial discrimination in promotions, 
using personnel data from a large U.S. firm and also data from the National 
Compensation Survey.  We find strong empirical support for the theoretical model’s 
predictions concerning promotion probabilities, whereas empirical support is mixed for 
the model’s predictions concerning the wage growth attached to promotions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 It is well established that racial minorities and women tend to fare worse than 
whites and men in a number of measurable labor market outcomes.  While racial and 
gender differences in preferences and productivity may explain part of these differences 
in labor market outcomes, it is frequently argued that discrimination also plays a role.  
There is now a voluminous literature on labor market discrimination, and it focuses 
heavily on discrimination in wages and hiring decisions.  Discrimination in promotion 
decisions has been studied less frequently and is the subject of our analysis.  By 
discrimination in promotion decisions we mean a situation in which workers from a 
disadvantaged group (e.g. racial minorities or women) are promoted less frequently in 
equilibrium than are observably similar workers from an advantaged group (e.g. whites or 
men) who have the same job performance in a given position.   
 A potential theoretical explanation for discrimination in promotion decisions was 
proposed in Milgrom and Oster (1987), building on Waldman’s (1984) model describing 
the signaling role of promotions.  The central feature of their model is an informational 
asymmetry, whereby a worker’s current employer observes the worker’s productivity 
perfectly whereas other employers in the market only observe the worker’s job 
assignment (i.e. whether the worker was promoted), interpreting this assignment as a 
signal of the worker’s ability.  Their theory assumes there are two types of workers:  
Visibles (e.g. white or males) are workers whose abilities are known to all potential 
employers, whereas Invisibles (e.g. minorities or females) are workers whose abilities can 
be concealed by the employer from other potential employers.  The idea behind this 
“Invisibility Hypothesis” is that workers with advantaged backgrounds are more likely to 
be recognized for their abilities by potential employers.  One interpretation of this 
concerns social networking; whites and/or males may benefit from “old boys’ club” 
connections that make their skills more visible to prospective employers.1  An 
                                                 
1
 To justify their “Invisibility Hypothesis”, Milgrom and Oster (1987) provide the following elaboration:  
“There are many causes contributing to the relative lack of recognition for disadvantaged workers.  
Prejudice – in the form of misperceptions rather than antipathy – can cause an employer to overlook a 
potentially good employee.  So, too, can the failure of an employee to ‘toot his own horn,’ whether the 
reluctance to do so comes from shyness, or pride, or cultural taboos.  The existence of clubs that limit the 
membership of women, nonwhites, or religious or ethnic minorities; job segregation which is not per se 
inefficient but which keeps some people out of view; exclusive neighborhoods; out-of-town conventions 
that are hard for some working mothers to attend – all of these things contribute to a separation that makes 
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implication of the informational asymmetry that is assumed for Invisibles is that 
employers with private information about their workers’ productivities can earn excess 
profits on highly productive Invisibles, since the talents of these workers are unobserved 
by competing employers.  Hence, discrimination in promotions exists whereby some 
high-ability Invisibles are inefficiently denied promotions.   
The first of two main objectives in our paper is to extend signaling models such as 
the Milgrom and Oster analysis in a way that allows us to generate testable implications.  
We construct a theoretical model that incorporates human capital investment decisions on 
the part of workers, strategic promotion decisions on the part of employers, asymmetric 
information about worker ability, and a two-level job hierarchy.  A central feature of our 
argument concerns the degree to which tasks vary across levels of the job hierarchy.  We 
show that if job tasks vary substantially across hierarchical levels, then the inefficiency in 
promotion decisions identified by Milgrom and Oster (whereby some high-ability 
Invisibles are denied promotions) can be mitigated.  On the other hand, if the tasks 
associated with the different levels are broadly similar then there is more discrimination 
in promotion decisions for Invisibles.   
Our second main objective is to evaluate the testable implications of our model 
empirically, using personnel data from a large U.S. firm and from the National 
Compensation Survey (NCS).  The personnel data contain information on promotions, 
wages, job performance, and personal characteristics.  The NCS data contain information 
on job characteristics, allowing us to construct within-occupation measures of the degree 
to which tasks vary across levels of a job hierarchy.  Although our theory could be 
applied equally well to study discrimination against racial minorities, women, or any 
other group that is thought to be “invisible” to the outside market, in this paper we focus 
only on racial discrimination.  This is because, in the firm we analyze, significant 
differences in promotion rates exist between whites and nonwhites but not between men 
and women.  Clearly, in other firms, discrimination against women may be important 
even though it is apparently not in the firm we study.         
                                                                                                                                                 
some workers less visible to potential new employers.”  A micro-foundation for this assumption is provided 
in Mishra (2003). 
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Our empirical results strongly support our theory’s implications concerning the 
probability of promotion.  That is, we find that promotion probabilities are lower for 
nonwhites than for whites, ceteris paribus, and that this racial difference in promotion 
probabilities is mitigated in job hierarchies that demonstrate significant variability of 
tasks across hierarchical levels.  We find mixed empirical support for the theory’s 
implications for the wage growth attached to promotions.  On the one hand, we find 
support for the prediction that the wage growth attached to promotion is higher for 
nonwhites than whites.  On the other hand, our empirical results do not support the 
prediction that the racial difference in wage growth just described is mitigated when tasks 
become more variable across hierarchical levels.  Later in the paper we provide a 
potential explanation for the mixed support of the predictions regarding wage growth. 
To illustrate one of the central ideas in our theory, consider an example that 
compares two job hierarchies arising in different production contexts.  The first consists 
of assistant professors (at the low level) and tenured associate professors (at the high 
level).  Both jobs in this hierarchy involve virtually the same tasks (namely research, 
teaching and advising, and administrative responsibilities, though the mix of these tasks 
frequently changes somewhat following a promotion to associate professor).2  The second 
hierarchy consists of technicians (at the low level) and general managers (at the high 
level).  In this case, tasks change significantly when a worker is promoted from 
technician to general manager.  We show in this paper that discrimination in promotions 
should be more pronounced in the first hierarchy than in the second.  
The logic behind this result is as follows.  Invisibles deciding whether to invest in 
costly human capital accumulation early in their careers face the following problem, 
arising from a double moral hazard problem in the promotion process.  The firm wants 
these workers to invest in productivity-enhancing human capital.  Since such investments 
increase the likelihood of promotion (and an accompanying wage increase), the prospect 
of promotion serves as an incentive for workers to invest.  On the other hand, after 
Invisibles have invested the firm might choose not to promote them, so as to avoid 
                                                 
2
 We use this example simple to illustrate a hierarchy characterized by similar tasks across levels, 
abstracting from the up-or-out nature of contracts in academia.  However, similarity in tasks across 
hierarchical levels in academia, law, and the military has also been considered in explaining the prevalence 
of up-or-out contracts in these settings.  Kahn and Huberman (1988), O’Flaherty and Siow (1995) and 
Ghosh and Waldman (2006) are some papers in that vein.   
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sending a positive signal to other firms in the market about these workers’ abilities.  
Since wages are determined by spot market contracts, and since a promotion sends a 
positive signal to all firms in the market about a worker’s ability, a promotion 
necessitates giving the worker a wage increase to prevent him from being stolen by a 
rival firm.  Thus, to avoid paying this wage increase the employer might inefficiently 
choose not to promote the worker.  Since Invisibles foresee this and will therefore be 
reluctant to invest in human capital, the firm faces a commitment problem in convincing 
such workers to invest.  The commitment problem disappears, however, if the 
productivity of a promoted Invisible is sufficiently high in the high-level job relative to 
productivity in the low-level job.  In that case, it is beneficial for the firm to promote the 
Invisible who has invested in human capital, even at the cost of sending a positive signal 
to the market of this worker’s ability.  Thus, Invisibles are willing to invest in human 
capital and can be assured that such investments will enhance their promotion prospects.  
This scenario in which the commitment problem disappears arises when the job tasks 
differ substantially across hierarchical levels, so that the worker’s productivity differs 
significantly between the two jobs and the opportunity cost (in terms of the worker’s 
foregone output in the high-level job) of not promoting the Invisible is large.  Note that in 
the case of Visibles, the firm never has an incentive to inefficiently withhold promotions 
from these workers, since their abilities are publicly observed by all firms in the market.  
The result is that the ability threshold beyond which a worker gets promoted is higher for 
Invisibles than for Visibles.3       
  To summarize, discrimination against Invisibles in promotion decisions is 
mitigated if the gain to the employer in correctly assigning the worker to the high-level 
job through a promotion is high enough to compensate for the loss (in terms of higher 
wage costs) of signaling the worker to be of high ability.  This is the case when the tasks 
in both job levels differ substantially.  In contrast, if the tasks at both job levels are 
broadly similar (as is the case, for example, in law firms, academic institutions, medical 
institutions and the military) more discrimination against Invisibles should be observed.4  
                                                 
3
 Some empirical evidence of higher promotion standards for women than men can be found in Pekkarinen 
and Vartianen (2003), Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller (1997), and Jones and Makepeace (1996).  
4
 While not conclusive evidence of discrimination, there is evidence that females are under-represented in 
these fields.  Spurr (1990) shows that although the proportion of female lawyers has grown rapidly in 
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From a welfare perspective, the problem of inefficient promotions is exacerbated by 
inefficient human capital acquisition on the part of Invisibles.  An implication of the 
analysis in Milgrom and Oster (1987) is that discrimination in promotion decisions can 
persist even absent any shared tastes for discrimination by any market actors.  The 
empirical prediction of our model is that, controlling for other factors and in particular for 
worker performance in the low-level job, in hierarchies where job tasks are broadly 
similar across levels the degree of discrimination in promotions against Invisibles should 
be greater than in hierarchies where the tasks differ substantially across levels.5 
In addition to contributing to the literature on discrimination in promotions, our 
analysis contributes to a growing literature on the role of asymmetric learning in labor 
markets (e.g. Greenwald (1986), Lazear (1986), MacLeod and Malcomson (1988), 
Gibbons and Katz (1991), Doiron (1995), Grund (1999), Pinkston (2004), and Schonberg 
(2004)).  The application of asymmetric learning to the context of promotion decisions, in 
particular the idea that promotions serve as a signal of worker ability, was first developed 
in Waldman (1984), and this idea has received considerable attention in the subsequent 
theoretical literature (e.g. Milgrom and Oster (1987), Ricart i Costa (1988), Waldman 
(1990), Bernhardt (1995), Chang and Wang (1996), Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001), 
Owan (2004), and Golan (2005)).  Despite the importance of the promotion-as-signal 
hypothesis in the theoretical literature, until recently the idea had not been tested 
                                                                                                                                                 
recent years there is evidence that women are promoted less frequently to partnership in major U.S. law 
firms.  Similarly, Rhode (2001) finds that “women in the legal profession remain underrepresented in 
positions of greatest status, influence, and economic reward.  They account for only 15% of federal judges 
and law firm partners, 10% of law school deans and 5% of managing partners of large firms”.  She finds 
that under-representation of women of color is still greater.  Similar evidence from the legal profession is 
found in Padavic and Reskin (2003) and Gorman (2001).  In two studies of academia, Ginther and Hayes 
(1999, 2003) find that substantial gender differences in promotion to tenure exist after controlling for 
productivity, demographic characteristics, and primary work activity in the humanities.  DeAngelis (2000) 
finds that only 10 percent of females graduating from medical school between 1979 and 1993 advanced to 
the level of medical school faculty.  Evidence from the military shows that women’s representation in the 
officer ranks was about equal to their representation in the enlisted ranks (Manning and Wight 2000), but 
female and minority officers were concentrated in less-prestigious administrative and supply areas and 
underrepresented in tactical operations, from which two-thirds of the general and flag officers were drawn.   
5
 Note that this result would not obtain in the Milgrom-Oster framework.  There, the most productive 
Invisibles are not promoted because there is no way for the firm to make any rent off of them once they are 
promoted.  In our model the firm can earn rents because of firm-specific human capital combined with the 
hierarchical structure. 
 7 
empirically.  Another contribution of our analysis, therefore, is to add to a newly 
emerging empirical literature on the signaling role of promotions.6 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
To set the stage for our theoretical and empirical analysis, in this section we 
survey the theoretical literature on discrimination and some alternative theoretical 
explanations for racial and gender differences in promotions, as well as summarizing the 
empirical literature on racial and gender differences in promotions.  Although our 
empirical work focuses only on racial differences, in this section we also discuss the 
literature on gender differences since our theory provides a basis for analyzing gender 
discrimination in future research using other data.   
The theoretical literature offers a number of potential explanations for 
discrimination in the workplace.  The two main theories of discrimination are those based 
on tastes (or personal prejudice) following Becker (1957) and those based on statistical 
discrimination following Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973).  Taste-based theories assume 
that members of one group in the workplace have distaste for interacting with members 
of another group (e.g. white supervisors may have distaste for hiring nonwhite 
employees, white workers may have distaste for working with nonwhite co-workers, or 
white customers may have distaste for consuming goods and services produced by 
nonwhite workers).  Theories of statistical discrimination, on the other hand, assume that 
employers have imperfect information about potential workers’ skills and productivity, 
treating race or gender as signals of these characteristics.  Thus, individuals from 
different groups may be treated differently by the employer in equilibrium even if they 
                                                 
6
 DeVaro and Waldman (2006) is the first study to test empirically the promotion-as-signal hypothesis, 
finding support for the theory using personnel data from a single, large American firm in the financial 
services industry.  In that analysis, workers were differentiated by their (publicly observable) education 
levels, with higher educational attainment being associated with higher ability levels on average.  
Consistent with the promotion-as-signal hypothesis, evidence of inefficient promotion decisions was found 
to be strongest for the least-educated workers.  The logic is that the positive signal that the market receives 
when such workers are promoted is larger than the corresponding signal for higher-educated workers, since 
the latter are already perceived as high ability by the market.  A corroborating result was found in Belzil 
and Bognanno (2005).  Using an eight-year panel of promotion histories of 30,000 American executives, 
they found that the promotion probability is decreasing in the level of educational attainment.  In the 
present analysis, the relevant distinction between workers is not educational attainment but rather race and 
gender, with the prediction that inefficiency in promotions should exist to a greater extent for the 
disadvantaged Invisibles (i.e. racial minorities or women) as previously explained.   
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are equally productive and otherwise observably similar.  More recently, Lundberg and 
Startz (1983) and Coate and Loury (1993) have extended the statistical theory of 
discrimination to include human capital decisions by the workers.  Coate and Loury show 
that, even when identifiable groups are equally endowed ex ante, affirmative action can 
create a situation in which employers (correctly) perceive the groups to be unequally 
productive, ex post. 
Athey, Avery and Zemsky (2000) argue that the taste-based and statistical 
theories are best suited for explaining discrimination in hiring rather than in promotion 
decisions.  They offer an alternative theory of discrimination in promotions to the 
signaling perspective offered in Milgrom and Oster (1987) and in our analysis.  In 
particular, they study how diversity evolves at a firm with entry-level and upper-level 
employees who vary in ability and type.  Their logic is based on mentoring and the 
dynamic consequences of having fewer mentoring opportunities for the lower-level 
employees.   
A theoretical explanation for gender discrimination in promotion decisions is 
developed in Lazear and Rosen (1990).  They present a model in which promotion rates 
are lower for females than for equally productive males.  This arises because, while 
equally productive in market work, women have a comparative (and absolute) advantage 
in the nonmarket sector.  Women are therefore more likely than men to separate from the 
firm.  Since the social cost of a departure is greater for the worker in the high-level job 
than in the low-level job, given ability, males are promoted to the high-level job over 
females who are equally productive in the low-level job.   
The empirical literature on gender differences in promotions has yielded mixed 
results, though evidence of promotion differences favoring females is less common than 
the reverse case.  A recent analysis of promotions using data from a cross section of 
establishments found lower rates of promotion for women than for men with similar 
observed characteristics and the same job-specific performance ratings (Blau and DeVaro 
2007).  Other studies have found similar results using different data (Cabral, Ferber, and 
Green, 1981; Olson and Becker, 1983; Cannings 1988; Spurr 1990; McCue 1996; Jones 
and Makepeace, 1996; Cobb-Clark 2001; Gjerde 2002; Ransom and Oaxaca 2005; 
Acosta 2006).  In contrast, studies such as Stewart and Gudykunst (1982), Gerhart and 
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Milkovich (1989), and Hersch and Viscusi (1996) have found the reverse result.  Lewis 
(1986) found no gender difference in promotion rates among comparable federal white-
collar workers; Powell and Butterfield (1994) found no evidence of a “glass ceiling” for 
women in a study of promotion decisions to federal government Senior Executive Service 
positions; and Giuliano, Levine, and Leonard (2005) found no gender difference in 
promotion rates, using data from a single, large, U.S. retail employer.  In a longitudinal 
study of individual educators in Oregon and New York, Eberts and Stone (1985) found 
that a gender difference favoring males in the early 1970s diminished and became 
insignificant by the late 1970s, arguing that equal opportunity employment enforcement 
contributed to the decline.7     
The empirical literature on racial differences in promotion rates has been more 
consistent in its conclusions than the literature on gender differences.  The most frequent 
finding is that nonwhite workers have lower promotion rates than white workers.  In 
other cases no difference in promotion rates is found, though it is virtually never the case 
that whites have lower promotion rates than nonwhites.  Table 1 summarizes the results 
of some papers in this branch of the literature.  In summary, the evidence from the 
empirical literature on race clearly indicates lower promotion rates for nonwhites than 
whites, whereas the empirical literature on gender is more mixed (though promotion rates 
favoring men appear more common than promotion rates favoring women).  Consistent 
with this literature, in the firm we study there is clear evidence of lower promotion 
probabilities for nonwhites than whites but no evidence of a gender gap in promotions.  
 
 
                                                 
7
 While these studies used data from the United States, others have investigated gender differences in 
promotion rates outside the United States.  As a whole, the international evidence is somewhat less 
favorable to women than is the evidence based on US data.  Studies finding lower promotion rates for 
women include Bamberger, Admati-Dvir, and Harel’s (1995) study of two Israeli high-tech companies; 
Pekkarinen and Vartianinen’s (2004) analysis of panel data on Finnish metalworkers; Sabatier and 
Carrere’s (2005) analysis of academic researchers in France; and Ranson and Reeves’ (1995) study of 
computer professionals in a western Canadian city.  Wright, Baxter, and Birkelund (1995) compare the 
U.S., Canada, the U.K., Australia, Sweden, Norway, and Japan, concluding that evidence of lower 
promotion rates for women is weaker in the U.S. than for the other countries.  Using a panel of British 
households, Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2003) found that, after controlling for observed and 
unobserved worker heterogeneity, women are promoted at roughly the same rate as men but receive smaller 
wage increases from promotion.  Also relevant is Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller’s (1997) finding, based on 
white-collar workers from the Austrian Microcensus, that females have to meet higher ability standards 
than males to achieve promotions.   
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III. THEORETICAL MODEL AND ANALYSIS 
 We present the theoretical model and analysis in three parts.  In the first, we 
present the basic setup for the theoretical model.  In the second, we present the model’s 
main results and describe the equilibrium, first for Visible workers and then for Invisible 
workers.  In the third, we translate the model’s main results into testable implications. 
 
A) Basic Setup 
The starting point for our analysis is the notion that nonwhites (or females) are 
potentially “invisible” from the perspective of other employers in the market.  We 
consider an economy in which a single good is produced, with its price per unit 
normalized to one.  Firms face perfect competition in the product market, and both 
workers and firms are risk-neutral with discount rates of zero.  Careers last for two 
periods, and in each period labor supply is perfectly inelastic and fixed at one unit for 
each worker.  We describe workers as “young” in the first period and “old” in the second.  
Job hierarchies consist of two levels:  Job 1 is a lower-level job to which workers are 
assigned when they enter a particular firm in the first period, and Job 2 is a higher-level 
job into which some workers are promoted in the second period.  Workers have the 
option to invest in acquiring α units of human capital in the first period, at a cost of z.  
Such an investment has both a general and a specific component.  We denote the general 
component as β and the specific component as α – β, where we require that 1 < β < α.8  
Let ηi denote worker i’s intrinsic ability.  A worker does not observe his ability 
but knows it is drawn from the uniform distribution on the interval [ηL, ηH].  Letting yijt 
denote the output of worker i in Job j in Period t, output in both jobs is given by yijt = 
kijt(dj + cjηi), where kijt is a factor that augments output in the second period if the worker 
has invested in acquiring human capital in the first period.  We assume that ki11 = 1, kij2 = 
α if the worker invests in human capital in the first period, and kij2 = 1 if the worker does 
not invest.  We further assume c2 > c1 and d1 > d2, so that output grows faster as a 
function of intrinsic ability in Job 2 than in Job 1.  This implies a smooth rising job ladder 
for workers, in which it is efficient for the employer to promote higher-ability workers.  
To make the case of promotion interesting, we assume d1+ c1ηH < d2 + c2ηH, so that a 
                                                 
8
 Later we impose a more specific restriction on α. 
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positive fraction of the workers are more productive in Job 2 than in Job 1.  Otherwise, 
old workers would always be retained in Job 1.  We write this condition in terms of c2 as 
follows: 
 c2 > c1 + ∆, where ∆ = (d1 – d2)/ηH      (1) 
We define η´ as the level of ability for which a worker is equally productive in Jobs 1 and 
2.  That is, η´ is defined by the following equation: d1 + c1η´ = d2 + c2η´, so that η´ = (d1 – 
d2)/(c2 – c1). 
An important point concerns our interpretation of changes in c2.  Holding c1 
constant, an increase in c2 implies an increase of worker productivity in Job 2 relative to 
Job 1.  A natural interpretation concerns the degree to which tasks vary across levels of 
the job hierarchy.  For example, when both Jobs 1 and 2 involve tasks that are very 
similar (the case of a relatively small difference between c2 and c1), there will not be 
much difference between a worker’s productivity in Job 1 and his productivity in Job 2.  
In this case, the cost to the firm (in terms of the worker’s foregone output in Job 2) of not 
promoting a worker out of Job 1 is relatively modest, since the worker is doing basically 
the same work in either job, meaning his productivity is roughly the same in either job.  
In contrast, when the tasks in Job 2 differ greatly from those in Job 1 (the case in which 
c2 is high relative to c1, meaning the worker’s productivity in Job 2 is high relative to 
productivity in Job 1), the firm incurs greater costs of foregone output in Job 2 by 
retaining high-ability workers in Job 1 rather than promoting them.9    
We distinguish between two types of workers:  Visibles and Invisibles.  At the 
end of the first period, the first-period productivity of Visibles is perfectly observed and 
verifiable both by their initial employers and by all outside firms.  In contrast, the 
productivity of Invisibles is private information for the initial employer, while outside 
firms observe only the worker’s job assignment (i.e. whether a promotion occurs).  The 
first-period wage is determined by the zero-profit condition of the firm for the worker’s 
entire career.   
                                                 
9
 Here we implicitly assume that in tasks that are more complex it is better to promote higher ability 
workers, which in fact translates into a higher marginal product.  There are two effects.  First, higher-ability 
jobs value ability more highly, so that those with high performance in the lower level jobs are the ones 
promoted.  Second, there are differences across jobs in comparative advantage so that those better at Job 1 
are those typically with a comparative advantage at Job 1 and are thus not promoted.  The more recent 
literature, such as Gibbons and Waldman (1999), implicitly assumes that for most jobs it is the first effect 
that is most important. 
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B) Equilibrium Describing Job Assignments for Visibles and Invisibles 
 The game begins with Nature assigning each worker a level of ability, ηi.  At the 
beginning of Period 1, firms post wage offers.  Young workers allocate themselves 
amongst firms and are employed in Job 1.  A spot market contract specifies the wage that 
either of these worker types receives while young.10  In Period 1, the workers decide 
whether or not to accumulate human capital.  Contingent on the worker’s decision to 
acquire human capital, the worker’s second-period wage and firm are determined as 
follows.  For Invisibles, after observing the worker’s productivity at the end of Period 1, 
the initial employer decides whether to promote the worker to Job 2.  After observing the 
worker’s second-period job assignment, the outside firms bid for the worker, thereby 
determining the worker’s wage in Period 2.  The initial employer and all outside firms 
make simultaneous wage offers, and after observing these the worker accepts a job at the 
firm that offers the highest wage.11 Hence, when entering the labor market a young 
worker maximizes expected lifetime income minus the cost of investing in human capital, 
if he chooses to invest.  
 
(a) Visible Workers:  
Our solution concept is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, and the following 
proposition describes the equilibrium.  All proofs are in Appendix A.  
 
Proposition 1:  In the first period, for β sufficiently high, all Visibles invest in acquiring 
human capital.  All are assigned to Job 1 in the first period and are paid a wage  
W1 = d1+c1((ηL+ηH)/2)+X1(α-β)[d2+c2((ηH+ηL)/2)]+(1-X1)(α-β)[d1+c1(ηH+ηL)/2)], 
where X1 is the probability that the worker is promoted to Job 2 in the second period and 
(1- X1) is the probability that the worker is not promoted.  In the second period, Visibles 
                                                 
10
 In the case of Invisibles there is no benefit to long-term contracts, so we assume that wages are 
determined by spot-market contracting.  Note further that, since an Invisible’s output is privately observed 
by the worker’s employer, any wage specified in such a spot-contract consists of a wage determined prior 
to production rather than a wage determined by a piece-rate contract where compensation depends on the 
realization of output. 
11
 While the assumption of simultaneous wage offers might appear restrictive (compared with model of 
Milgrom and Oster (1987) in which the initial employer could make a counter offer), we could generate the 
same results we derive here by assuming that there is always an exogenous probability of a worker 
changing jobs irrespective of the wage offer (as in Greenwald 1986).   
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with ability ηi ≥ η´ are promoted to Job 2, and those with ηi < η´ are retained in Job 1.  
Promoted workers are paid a wage of β(d2+c2ηi), and those remaining in Job 1 are paid 
a wage of β(d1+c1ηi). 
 
The second-period allocation of workers to jobs is efficient for Visibles because 
there is perfect information about their ability.  Furthermore, as long as the general 
component of human capital is sufficiently high, workers choose to invest in human 
capital so as to achieve higher second-period wages.12  The point is that the workers’ 
second-period wages correspond to the output the workers would have generated if 
employed at any of the firms in the outside market, and outside employers value the 
general component of a worker’s human capital.  In contrast, if human capital 
investments were entirely firm-specific then none of the workers would have invested, 
since firms in the outside market would not value these skills and would not be willing to 
pay for them.  In that case, there is no incentive for the initial employer to compensate 
workers for investments in specific human capital.   
 
(b) Invisible Workers: 
 For Invisibles, we analyze the problem as an extensive-form game with imperfect 
information (Harsanyi 1967, 1968, 1969).  Our solution concept is “market-Nash” 
equilibrium where, given the initial employer’s strategy, the market has a strategy which 
is consistent with what would result from competition among a large number of firms.  
Similarly, given the market’s strategy, the initial employer maximizes expected profits.  
The consequence is that the market strategy must everywhere be consistent with a zero-
expected-profit constraint.13  To overcome the problem of multiple equilibria, we place 
the following two restrictions on the strategies of the players.  First, given that the market 
is employing its specified strategy, a first-period employer cannot be indifferent between 
his own specified strategy and some other strategy:  the strategy of the first-period 
                                                 
12
 See the proof of Proposition 1 for an exact threshold for β. 
13
 Suppose that the first-period employer’s strategy is such that a worker is assigned to Job 1 at wage rate 
W if and only if the worker’s ability is between η1 and η2.  Then the market-Nash equilibrium implies that 
the market’s wage offer must equal max{d2+c2((η1+ η2)/2), d1+c1((η1+ η2)/2)}.  When we refer to expected 
output, we mean “given the job assignment that maximizes the expectation.” 
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employer must be a unique optimal strategy.  Second, given that the job assignment is 
fixed, the market wage offer must be a continuous function of the first-period employer’s 
wage offer.14  These two restrictions eliminate implausible equilibria.  We shall refer to 
an equilibrium that satisfies these additional restrictions as a “restricted market-Nash” 
equilibrium.15  Finally, we impose a restriction on the cost of human capital investment, 
z, assuming that it is not so high as to prevent workers from ever investing, nor is it so 
low that there is always investment (in which case the issue of the type of contracts to 
provide incentives for workers to invest in human capital is irrelevant).  Later we will 
impose a more precise range for z.  In what follows, we solve the game backwards, 
considering first the promotion decision of the employer at the beginning of Period 2 and 
then deriving the investment decision of the worker at the beginning of Period 1.  
 
(i) Employer Behavior 
We now derive the minimum ability threshold, η*, such that workers above that 
ability level are promoted by the firm.  If worker i, who has acquired human capital in the 
first period, is promoted to Job 2 in the second period, the worker’s productivity is yi22 = 
α(d2 + c2ηi).  If the same worker is retained in Job 1, his productivity is yi12 = α(d1+c1ηi).  
The worker’s wages are determined by the wage offers of the firms in the outside market.  
In the eyes of the outside market, a worker promoted to Job 2 has an average ability of 
(η* + ηH)/2, and a worker retained in Job 1 has an average ability of (η* + ηL)/2.  Hence, 
the corresponding wages that the worker is paid in Jobs 2 and 1 are β{d2 + c2(η* + ηH)/2} 
and β{d1 + c1(η* + ηL)/2)}, respectively.16  We impose the condition α > ηH/ηL, which is 
sufficient to ensure that workers will not be fired from the initial firm.  This condition 
implies that the accumulated human capital is high enough so that it is beneficial for the 
firm to keep the lowest ability worker in either Job 1 or Job 2 if he has invested.   
                                                 
14
 This is similar to a restriction suggested in Milgrom and Roberts (1982). 
15
 This equilibrium concept was used by Waldman (1984). 
16
 More precisely, the outside offer to promoted workers is given by max{β(d2+c2(η*+ηH)/2), 
β(d1+c1(η*+ηH)/2)}. 
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To derive η*, we equate the employer’s profit when the worker is retained in Job 1 
to the profit when the worker is promoted to Job 2, given that the worker invests in 
human capital.  Thus, the following equation defines η*:  
 
    α(d2+c2η*) – β[d2+c2(η*+ηH)/2] = α(d1+c1η*) – β[d1+c1(η*+ηL)/2]                      (2´) 
 
Therefore: 
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                  = 0      otherwise 
Thus, a given value of α implies a corresponding value of η* that represents the ability of 
the marginal worker promoted by the firm. 
Recall that in the full information case corresponding to Visible workers, the 
minimum ability threshold determining promotions is η´, as given by the following 
expression: η´ = (d1 – d2)/(c2 – c1).  Comparing this expression to (2), and using the 
condition d1 – d2 < (c2 – c1)ηH, we establish the following lemma:  
 
Lemma 1: η´ < η*  
  
This result reveals the inefficiency in promotions that arises from asymmetric 
information.  In the case of Visibles, for which the employer and the outside firms 
observe the output of the worker perfectly at the end of the first period, the proportion of 
workers promoted was (ηH – η´)/(ηH – ηL), while for Invisibles it is only (ηH – η*)/(ηH – 
ηL).  Some workers who would be promoted in the case of symmetric information are 
instead retained in Job 1 so that the initial employer may conceal the true ability of these 
workers from the outside market.17  Next we perform comparative statics on the ability 
threshold for promotion of Visibles and Invisibles.  Lemma 2 shows how changes in c2 
affect the promotion thresholds of Visibles and Invisibles. 
                                                 
17
 Note that if α were to equal 1 in equation (2), then η* > ηH.  Intuitively, when human capital investment 
does not augment output then no promotions occur.  Thus, our restriction that α is strictly positive ensures 
that the promotion case is interesting.  
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Lemma 2:  d(η*– η´ )/dc2 < 0 
 
Recalling that c2 is the slope of the output function for Job 2 and that an increase 
in c2, holding c1 fixed, raises the productivity of a worker in Job 2 relative to Job 1, we 
now study the effect of an increase in c2, holding c1 and d1 fixed.  Note that d2 need not 
remain fixed and might decrease as c2 increases.  We make no assumption regarding 
whether decreases in d2 accompany increases in c2, and our effect of primary interest 
(stated in Lemma 2) is insensitive to such assumptions.  However, the magnitude of the 
decrease in d2 that may accompany an increase in c2 determines whether η´ decreases, 
stays the same, or increases.18  Another important point concerns the sign of dη*/dc2.  
From the proof of Lemma 2 we know that: 
2122
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∂
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∂ ηηηη .  Since 0 
< Y < 1, and since η´ < η*, the first term on the right-hand side is negative, while the sign 
of the second term is determined by the sign of dη*/dc2, which in turn depends on 
whether (and by how much) d2 decreases as c2 increases.   
Next we analyze worker behavior for the case of Invisibles.  To guarantee 
existence, we impose the following restriction on z:  φ(c1 + ∆) < z < φ(c2′′), where φ(c2) = 
β[d2+c2(η*+ηH)/2 – {d1+c1(η*+ηL)/2}] [(ηH – η*)/( ηH – ηL)].  In this expression, c2′′ is the 
upper bound on c2, and (c1 + ∆) is the lower bound on c2, above which the issue of 
promotion makes sense, which comes from equation (1).19 
                                                 
18
 Looking ahead to the empirical work, this means that any assumption made about how d2 decreases as c2 
increases would affect only the predicted sign of the “main effect” of task variability on promotion 
probability.  This sign on the estimate of the main effect is usually negative in our data, so that the 
probability of promotion decreases when tasks become more variable across hierarchical levels.  This result 
is consistent with a decrease in d2 in the theoretical model that is large enough in magnitude so that dη´/dc2 
> 0, though we also find evidence in the data (for very high values of task variability) that dη*/dc2 < 0 is 
possible.  Given that η´ < η* (from Lemma 1), Lemma 2 implies that the disparity in promotion 
probabilities between Visibles and Invisibles decreases as task variability increases.  There are two effects 
present when dη´/dc2 > 0.  The first is that as variability increases it is more difficult to get promoted, and 
the second is the “inefficient promotion effect” (η* > η´).  As task variability increases, the first effect is the 
same for both Visibles and Invisibles, but the second (which is not present for Visibles) improves the 
promotion prospects for the Invisibles relative to the Visibles when task variability increases.   
 
19
 Note that for c2 > c2* there are multiple equilibria, one of which involves no workers investing in human 
capital.  We assume that the workers can coordinate behavior such that the realized equilibrium is the one 
that is Pareto optimal for the workers in that period.  Another way to state this is that we restrict attention to 
Perfectly Coalition-Proof Nash equilibria (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston 1987).  The assumption is 
reasonable and permits a neat characterization.   
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(ii) Worker Behavior 
A promoted Invisible is paid a wage of β[d2+c2(η*+ηH)/2], while if he is retained 
in Job 1 his wage is β[d1+c1(η*+ηL)/2].  If the worker invests, then his probability of 
promotion is X1 = Pr(η ≥ η*) = (ηH – η*)/(ηH – ηL), and his probability of not getting 
promoted is Pr(η < η*) = (η* – ηL)/(ηH – ηL).20  This follows from the fact that ability is 
drawn from a uniform distribution with support [ηL, ηH].  Thus, when deciding whether to 
acquire human capital, a worker weighs the cost of the human capital investment against 
the expected gain in wages.  Hence, a worker invests in human capital if the following 
inequality holds: 
β[d2+c2(η*+ηH)/2 – {d1+c1(η*+ηL)/2}] [(ηH – η*)/(ηH – ηL)] ≥ z.  (3)   
The left-hand side of this inequality is the expected gain to the worker from investing in 
human capital.  There exists a c2* for which this expression holds with equality, as 
established in the following proposition: 21  
 
Proposition 2:  For Invisibles, there exists c2* such that in equilibrium, for c2 ≥  c2*, 
workers invest in human capital, and in the second period workers of ability η ≥ η* are 
promoted to Job 2 whereas those with ability η < η* are retained in Job 1.  For c2 < c2*, 
none of the workers invests and none is promoted in the second period. 
 
The left-hand side of (3) is the product of two terms.  The first term, namely the 
first expression in square brackets and its coefficient β, is the wage effect, or the increase 
in wages that workers receive when promoted.  The second term, namely the second 
expression in square brackets, is the ex ante probability of promotion given that the 
worker invests.  From previous analysis we know that the sign of dη*/dc2 is determined 
by the magnitude of the decrease in d2 that may accompany an increase in c2.  The case 
that is most empirically relevant in our data is that d2 decreases by enough so that dη*/dc2 
> 0, meaning that η* increases towards an increasing η´ such that the distance between the 
                                                 
20
 A worker of extremely high ability could, in principle, be promoted even without investing in human 
capital.  However, this occurs with probability zero given our assumption α > ηH/ηL, which ensures that 
workers who invest are at a significant enough advantage than even the highest-ability worker who does 
not invest. 
21
 Note that η* is a function of c2 although we do not write this explicitly. 
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two thresholds narrows.  This has two effects on the left-hand side of (3).  One is the 
wage effect, which is given by the first term on the left-hand side of (3), and second is the 
promotion probability effect that is given by the second term on the left-hand side of (3).  
Note that the wage offered by the outside employers is a monotone function of η*.  Thus, 
with an increase in c2, as η* increases, the outside employers know that the average ability 
of promoted workers is higher and thus bid a higher wage.  This increases the first 
expression in brackets.  On the other hand, the second term on the left-hand side of (3), 
namely the ex ante probability of promotion, [(ηH – η*)/(ηH – ηL)], decreases.  We show 
that the wage effect dominates the promotion effect for an increase in c2.  Essentially, for 
c2 ≥ c2
*
 both the employers’ and the workers’ incentives can be satisfied.    
 
C) Testable Implications 
Prior to presenting the theoretical model’s testable implications, we introduce 
some notation.  Let yVP(d1, d2, c1, c2) denote the minimum output level required for a 
young Visible to be promoted to the higher-level job in the second period of his career in 
a job hierarchy with parameters d1, d2, c1, and c2.  Similarly, yIP(d1, d2, c1, c2) denotes the 
analogous threshold for Invisibles.  The differential treatment of Visibles and Invisibles 
in equilibrium gives rise to our first of four testable implications:  
 
Testable Implication 1:  Holding constant worker performance in Job 1, yVP(d1, d2, c1, c2) 
< yIP(d1, d2, c1, c2). 
 
This follows directly from Lemma 1 and is also a testable implication of Milgrom and 
Oster (1987).  By definition, we know that yVP(d1,d2,c1,c2) = α(d2 + c2η´) and 
yIP(d1,d2,c1,c2) = α(d2 + c2η*).  From this definition and Lemma 1 it follows that if the 
parameters of the job hierarchy remain the same, a higher η required for promotion to the 
next level translates directly to a higher output level being required for promotion.  Thus, 
Testable Implication 1 simply recasts Lemma 1 in terms of output rather than ability, 
implying that the minimum performance level required for Visibles to be promoted is 
lower than the corresponding threshold for Invisibles, other things equal.   
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A second implication of our analysis is that the difference in promotion 
probabilities between Visibles and Invisibles should be smaller when the tasks differ 
substantially across levels of the job hierarchy.  Let ξ(d1, d2, c1, c2) denote yIP(d1, d2, c1, 
c2) – yVP(d1, d2, c1, c2).  For simplicity we refer to this difference as ξ(c2), since we are 
interested in varying c2 while holding c1 and d1 constant.  Our second testable implication 
is stated as follows:    
 
Testable Implication 2:  Holding constant worker performance in Job 1, consider two 
different job hierarchies with parameters 2c  and  2c , such that, 22 cc < .  Then ξ( 2c ) < 
ξ( 2c ), i.e., when task variability across the two jobs is greater the difference in 
promotion rates between Visibles and Invisibles is smaller. 
 
This follows directly from Lemma 2.  As c2 increases (holding constant c1 and d1) the 
productivity of the worker in Job 2 increases relative to productivity in Job 1, and the 
distance between η´ and η* decreases.  We interpret an increase in c2 relative to c1 as an 
increase in the degree to which tasks differ between Jobs 1 and 2; when tasks are very 
different across hierarchical levels, the cost to the employer (in terms of foregone worker 
output in Job 2) is high if the worker is not promoted.  In contrast, if job tasks are similar 
across levels (the case when c2 – c1 is small) then the worker has roughly the same 
productivity in either job, so the employer has less to lose by retaining a worker in Job 1 
who would otherwise be promoted.  Thus, the difference in the minimum output 
thresholds for promotion between Invisibles and Visibles decreases as c2 increases.  
Turning to our third testable implication, let wIP(d1, d2, c1, c2) denote the wage 
received by a promoted Invisible worker in a job hierarchy with parameters d1, d2, c1, and 
c2, let wINP(d1, d2, c1, c2) denote the analogous wage for Invisibles who are not promoted.  
Let ζI(d1, d2, c1, c2) denote wIP(d1, d2, c1, c2) – wINP(d1, d2, c1, c2).  For notational 
simplicity we refer to this wage difference as ζI(c2), since we are interested in varying c2. 
Thus ζI(c2) represents the wage change associated with promotions of Invisibles.  In a 
similar vein we denote the wage change associated with the promotion of a Visible as 
ζV(c2).  That is, ζV(c2) = wVP(d1, d2, c1, c2) – wVNP(d1, d2, c1, c2), where wVP denotes the 
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average wage of promoted Visibles and wVNP denotes the average wage of Visibles who 
are not promoted.   
 
Testable Implication 3:  Holding constant worker performance in Job 1, ζI(c2) > ζV(c2). 
 
This says that the wage change associated with promotion of an Invisible is higher than 
that of a Visible.  In effect, the Invisible who is promoted is paid the average wage 
between the ability levels η* and ηH, whereas the average Visible who is promoted 
corresponds to the supports η´ and ηH.  The result follows, since η´ < η*.  
 
Finally, define ζ(c2) = ζI(c2) – ζV(c2).  Testable implication 4 concerns how this difference 
varies with the degree of task variability across hierarchical levels.  
 
Testable Implication 4:  Holding constant worker performance in Job 1, consider two 
different job hierarchies with parameters 2c  and  2c , such that, 22 cc < .  Then ζ( 2c ) < 
ζ( 2c ), i.e., when task variability across the two jobs is greater the wage increase attached 
to promotion becomes more similar for Invisibles and Visibles.  (Proof in Appendix A) 
 
The logic behind this is related to Testable Implication 2.  Outside employers bid for 
workers competitively.  When c2 – c1 is low the inefficiency in promotion decisions is 
higher and the outside bids account for that.  Hence, if a worker is promoted in such a 
regime then the outside employers correctly perceive the worker to be of higher ability 
than in a regime where c2 – c1 is higher, implying the allocation of workers is more 
correct.  The greater the degree of variability in tasks across hierarchical levels, the closer 
is the situation to the case of publicly-observable output (i.e. the case of Visibles), which 
in turn implies that inefficiency in job assignments diminishes, thereby reducing the 
amount by which Invisibles get larger wage increments when promoted.  
Finally, we note that there is also a fifth implication that is potentially testable if 
measures of on-the-job human capital investment are available, though no such measures 
are available in our data.  The fifth testable implication would say that, holding constant 
worker performance in Job 1, if the job hierarchies are such that tasks are similar in the 
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job ladders, then Visibles invest in human capital whereas Invisibles do not invest.  This 
implication follows from Propositions 1 and 2.  If c2 < c2*, Proposition 2 states that none 
of the Invisibles invest, whereas Proposition 1 states that all Visibles invest even when c2 
is small. 
   
IV. DATA AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Our primary dataset consists of the complete set of personnel records for all 
workers hired between January 1, 1989 and December 31, 1994 in a large U.S. firm 
(18,334 workers in total). 22  The firm is based in the Midwest but has establishments 
nationwide, is vertically integrated, and has divisions in health care, finance, research and 
development, manufacturing, sales, legal affairs, operations and distributions, and 
marketing.  During the last two decades the firm has had several mergers and 
acquisitions.  Gibbs and Hendricks (2004) compared the sales, number of employees, 
assets, market value, CEO compensation, salary structure, and yearly salary increases in 
this firm with the corresponding variables for other firms in the same industry, using data 
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the ExecuComp database.  Their 
comparison suggests that the firm is representative of large U.S. firms in that industry. 
The data include information on worker race, gender, age, marital status, 
disability status, tenure with the firm, tenure with the organizational unit, geographic 
location (both zip code and a building identifier), promotion and job-change history, 
performance rating, job title, and “functional area” from the following list:  Executive 
Management, Business Affairs, Administrative, Human Resources, Financial 
Development, Finance, Regulatory Quality Assurance, Legal, Government Affairs, 
Public Affairs, Marketing, Operations/Distributions, Manufacturing, Sales 
Representatives, Sales Management, Research and Development, Electronic Data 
Processing, Health Care, Product Services, Intern, Customer Operations, and Scientific 
Affairs.  Dates of promotion are recorded in the data.  The firm defines a promotion as a 
job change to a higher job level.  As noted by Gibbs and Hendricks, it is not possible to 
infer the firm’s job hierarchy from the data, since there are over 4000 categorical job 
titles that reveal little about relative levels.  We observe when the firm claims a 
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  To preserve confidentiality, we cannot disclose the name of the firm. 
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promotion occurred, and that is our definition of promotion.  Subjective performance 
evaluations by supervisors are available for workers periodically during their tenure with 
the firm, and these are based on a “DOGNUT” scale: “Distinguished”, “Outstanding”, 
“Good”, “Needs Improvement”, “Unsatisfactory”, and “Too New to Evaluate”.   
 Each time a worker experiences an “incident”, such as a job change or a change in 
pay, he receives a new record in the data.  The entire sample consists of 18,334 workers 
and 89,793 worker-incidents.  We organize the personnel data into worker-months.  The 
performance and wage variables require special coding.  When a performance rating was 
observed concurrently with a promotion or demotion (which happened often) we 
assumed that the rating pertained to the pre-promotion (or demotion) job.  We thus filled 
in this rating backwards in time for each month until we hit another performance rating, 
or a level change (i.e. another promotion or demotion), or the hiring date.  We did the 
same thing (backward filling) for performance ratings that were observed without a 
promotion or demotion.  Then, wherever it was possible without overwriting our 
backward filling of performance ratings, we filled in performance ratings forward in time 
until we hit another performance rating, or a level change, or a separation from the firm.  
We took the same approach for wages, though in this case when filling wages in forwards 
or backwards in time we stopped only for a job level change, another reported wage, a 
new hire, or a separation from the firm (but not a performance rating). 
 
National Compensation Survey (NCS) 
 Since the personnel data contain no information on the degree of task variability 
across hierarchical levels, we turn to the National Compensation Survey (NCS) for this 
complementary information.  The NCS is a restricted-use survey conducted by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics annually since 1997 to measure earnings and benefits by 
occupation and work level.  The sample for the NCS is selected in three stages.  First, 154 
representative metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas are selected.  Within these areas, 
sample establishments are selected, with larger establishments being more likely to be 
selected.  All industries except agriculture, the federal government and private 
households are included.  Finally, within each establishment, a number of jobs are 
selected, with more populated job titles having a higher probability of selection.  The 
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number of jobs selected depends upon the size of the establishment, with a maximum of 
twenty jobs selected.  No demographic information is obtained about the worker.  This 
sampling framework results in approximately 20,000 establishments and 137,000 jobs in 
1999, the year we use.  The information relevant to task variability across hierarchical 
levels comes from a set of ten “leveling factors” describing the nature of the work.  This 
information is collected by field economists who visit each establishment, either via 
interviews with the designated respondent or from formal written job descriptions.  The 
ten leveling factors (along with the ranges for the Likert scales on which they are 
measured) are:  1. knowledge (1-9); 2. supervision received (1-5); 3. guidelines (1-5); 4. 
complexity (1-6); 5. scope and effect (1-6); 6. personal contacts (1-4); 7. purpose of 
contacts (1-4); 8. physical demands (1-3); 9. work environment (1-3); 10. Supervisory 
duties (1-5).23  From these leveling factors we create a single index of within-occupation 
task variability across hierarchical levels, as explained in the next section.  Table 2a 
displays descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis, and Table 2b displays 
promotion frequencies by worker characteristics. 
 
V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Recall that Testable Implications 2 and 4 concern the implications of varying the 
parameter c2, which we interpret as changing the degree to which tasks vary across levels 
of the job hierarchy.  Since the personnel data contain no information on job 
characteristics, to address those two testable implications we draw on supplementary 
information from the NCS.  However, the information on job characteristics in the NCS 
is recorded (for each establishment) at the level of occupations, whereas in the personnel 
data we observe job titles and functional areas but not occupations.  Thus, to make 
relevant comparisons between the two data sets, for each job in the personnel records we 
must infer its occupation using the detailed job title and other information in the 
personnel record (See Appendix B for details).    
 For addressing Testable Implications 1 and 2, since the minimum output threshold 
required for promotion is unobserved by the econometrician, we restate the testable 
implications in terms of the observed data on promotions, worker performance, and 
                                                 
23
 For more detailed descriptions of these leveling factors see U.S. Department of Labor, BLS (1996). 
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worker characteristics.  As in the theoretical model, we use the subscript ijt to index 
worker i in Job j (where j = 1 is the pre-promotion job and j = 2 is the post-promotion 
job) in period t, where a period is a month in the empirical model.  Let Nonwhitei be a 
dummy variable equaling 1 if worker i is black, Hispanic, Asian, or “other nonwhite” and 
0 if the worker is white.  Let Promotionijt be a dummy variable equaling 1 if worker i is 
promoted out of job j in month t, and 0 otherwise, let Performanceijt be worker i’s 
performance rating in job j in month t, and let Xijt be a vector of controls (including 
gender, age, age squared, tenure at the firm, tenure at the firm squared, tenure in the job 
level, tenure in the job level squared, marital status as of the hiring date, part time status, 
and educational attainment).  We specify the following equations for the output of worker 
i in Job 1 in the first period (5.1) and the minimum output this worker must produce in 
Job 1 to be promoted (5.2): 
yi11 = f(Performancei11) + ei11          (5.1) 
yi11P = γ0 + γ1Nonwhitei + Xi11λ + ui11         (5.2) 
where f is a monotonically increasing function, and ei11 and ui11 are stochastic, mean-zero 
disturbances.  A promotion from Job 1 to Job 2 occurs if worker i produces a first-period 
output in Job 1 that exceeds the minimum output threshold, so that: 
Promotioni11 = 1 if yi11 – yi11P ≥ 0       (5.3) 
           = 0 otherwise 
 Recall that in the theoretical model ξ denotes yIP – yVP, which is the difference 
between Invisibles and Visibles in the minimum output threshold required for promotion.  
The empirical counterpart of ξ is the difference between the predicted value of (5.2) when 
Nonwhitei is evaluated at 1 and the predicted value of (5.2) when Nonwhitei is evaluated 
at 0.  Since Testable Implication 1 implies that ξ is positive, the corresponding prediction 
in the empirical model is that γ1 is positive.   
Substituting (5.1) and (5.2) into (5.3), and assuming that f is linear so that yi11 = α0 
+ α1Performancei11 + ei11 with α1 > 0, yields the following expression:   
Promotioni11 = 1 if β0 + β1Nonwhitei + β2Performancei11 + Xi11δ ≥ εi11  (5.4) 
         = 0 otherwise 
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where εi11 = ui11 – ei11, β0 = α0 – γ0, β1 = -γ1, β2 = α1, and δ = -λ.  Assuming that εi11 has the 
standard normal distribution, the promotion rule is described by the following probit 
model where Φ denotes the standard normal cdf:  
Prob(Promotioni11 = 1) =  Φ(β0 + β1Nonwhitei + β2Performancei11 + Xi11δ) (5.5) 
Thus, Testable Implication 1 implies that β1 is negative.   
Results from probit estimation of (5.5), for various configurations of control 
variables Xi11, are reported in Table 3.  A negative estimate for β1 is found in all 
specifications, and statistical significance at the ten percent level (on a one-tailed test) is 
achieved in each specification.24  Note that the coefficient of the gender dummy is 
statistically insignificant in each specification, confirming our earlier statement that 
gender differences in promotion appear not to exist in this firm.  Due to large numbers of 
missing values in the educational attainment and performance variables, the sample sizes 
shrink considerably in the specifications that include these variables.  However, when 
these variables are included they reveal that the probability of promotion increases with 
educational attainment and with the performance rating in the pre-promotion job.  Both of 
these results were also found in DeVaro and Waldman (2006) using personnel data from 
the firm in the financial services industry that was first analyzed by Baker, Gibbs, and 
Holmstrom (1994).  Since the estimated β1 is relatively insensitive to the inclusion of 
both these controls, and their inclusion reduces precision on the parameters of interest by 
significantly reducing the sample size, we do not include these controls in the subsequent 
models we estimate.         
 To address Testable Implication 2, we begin by constructing a new variable called 
Variabilityj using NCS data.  This variable is designed to proxy for the degree of task 
variability across hierarchical levels in occupation j.  To do this, we first normalize these 
leveling factors to zero-one, to take into account the varying ranges of responses.  We 
then add the responses to create a single task index.  Our variability measure is the 
within-occupation coefficient of variation of this index, using three-digit occupations.  
Note that this measure captures task variability within occupations.  As stated in 
Appendix B, less than eight percent of promotions in our data involve a change in 
                                                 
24
 Throughout the analysis, when directional hypotheses are implied by the theory we use one-tailed 
hypothesis tests in assessing statistical significance. 
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occupation, though for such promotions we would expect the resulting change in tasks to 
be larger than for within-occupation promotions, and a different measure of variability 
would be required.  
Note that to assign to each worker-month in the personnel data a particular value of this 
variability index, we need to know the occupation for that worker-month.  As described 
in Appendix B, we infer the three-digit occupation in the personnel data using 
information on the job title and functional area, thereby bridging the NCS and personnel 
data.  We then augment the probit model of (5.5) as follows: 
Prob(Promotioni11 = 1) =  Φ(β0 + β1Nonwhitei + β2Performancei11 + β3Variabilityj + 
β4(Variabilityj × Nonwhitei) + Xi11δ)  (5.6) 
Testable Implication 2 implies β4 > 0, meaning the disadvantage of nonwhites relative to 
whites in promotion probabilities (i.e. β1 < 0) is mitigated when tasks are more variable 
across hierarchical levels.   
 Results from probit estimation of (5.6), for various configurations of control 
variables Xi11, are reported in Table 4.  The results in Column 1, omitting controls, reveal 
support for the theoretical prediction (a negative coefficient on Nonwhite and a positive 
coefficient on the interaction of Nonwhite and Variability).  Note that the estimated main 
effect of Variability is negative.  As explained in Section III, this result is consistent with 
reducing the parameter d2 in the theoretical model (simultaneously with the increase in 
the parameter c2) by enough so that the ability thresholds η´ and η* increase.  Column 2 
reveals that the results are insensitive to the inclusion of our baseline controls.  However, 
in unreported tests we found that if we include the educational attainment and/or pre-
promotion job performance controls, statistical significance is lost on the parameters of 
interest.  Columns 3 and 4 add a control for the square of Variability to the specifications 
in columns 1 and 2, respectively.  We find that the theoretical predictions are still 
supported in the presence of the quadratic Variability control, though an interesting 
nonlinearity emerges in the marginal effect of Variability on promotion probability.  
While the coefficient on Variability remains negative, the coefficient on the square of 
Variability is positive, significant, and large enough in magnitude so that for sufficiently 
large values of Variability the sign of the marginal effect of Variability switches from 
negative to positive.        
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To address Testable Implication 3, we estimate the following regression:  
∆lnWit = pi0 + pi1Promotionijt + pi2Nonwhitei + pi3(Promotioni × Nonwhiteijt) + Xi11ρ + εit 
 
(5.7) 
where ∆lnWit ≡ lnWit – lnWit-1, and Wit is worker i’s salary in the post-promotion job 
while Wit-1 is worker i’s most-recently-recorded salary in the pre-promotion job.  Testable 
Implication 3 implies pi2 + pi3 > 0, so that promoted Invisibles experience higher wage 
increases than promoted Visibles.  Table 5 reports results for OLS estimation of 
regression (5.7).  Column 1 of Table 5 reports the specification that excludes the baseline 
control variables from (5.7), and the results support the theoretical prediction that pi2 + pi3 
> 0.  The result persists even in the presence of the baseline controls (Column 2) and the 
baseline controls plus performance controls (Column 4).  Although the theoretical result 
is unsupported in the two models that include controls for educational attainment 
(Columns 3 and 5), it should be noted that the sample size is dramatically reduced in the 
presence of education controls and that the education coefficients are never statistically 
significant. 
 To address Testable Implication 4, for the subsample for which Promotionit = 1 
we estimate the following augmented version of regression (5.7):  
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∆lnWit = pi0 + pi1Promotionijt + pi2Nonwhitei + pi3(Promotionijt × Nonwhitei) + 
pi4Variabilityj + pi5(Promotionijt × Variabilityj) + pi6(Nonwhitei × Variabilityj) + 
pi7(Promotionijt × Nonwhitei × Variabilityj) + Xi11ρ + εit  (5.8) 
In this specification, Testable Implication 4 implies pi4 + pi7 < 0.  Also, Testable 
Implication 3 in this more general specification than (5.7) implies pi2 + pi3 + (pi4 + 
pi7)Variabilityj > 0.  Results from OLS regression of (5.8) are displayed in Table 6, 
revealing that Testable Implication 4 is not supported empirically.  Across all 
specifications, pi4 + pi7 is positive rather than negative, since the estimated coefficient of 
the 3-way interaction is positive rather than negative as our theory predicts.  In the 
following section we discuss a potential explanation for the lack of empirical support for 
our Testable Implication 4.25  
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
                                                 
25
 A potential reason for the weak results in the wage-growth regressions is the way in which we have 
imputed wages when missing wages occur; in the next draft we plan to linearly impute the wages between 
actual observed wages.  Also, a potential problem with the wage growth regression is that the promotions 
of nonwhites may differ from those of whites in unmeasured ways (in particular by occupation).  The 
measured effect of nonwhite status in the regression might also reflect the effect of being promoted into or 
out of the types of occupations in which nonwhites are more likely to be employed.  However, including a 
full set of occupation controls in the model is not feasible, since then the effect of task variability (the 
primary theoretical effect of interest) cannot be identified, since it is a linear combination of 3-digit 
occupation dummies.   
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Building on work by Waldman (1984) and Milgrom and Oster (1987), we have 
proposed a new theory that potentially explains racial and gender discrimination in 
promotions as well as how and why such discrimination varies by the nature of the job 
hierarchy.  Four testable implications emerge from our theoretical model, all of which 
assume performance in the pre-promotion job is held constant: 1) promotion probabilities 
are lower for Invisibles than Visibles; 2) this gap in promotion probabilities between 
Invisibles and Visibles becomes smaller when job tasks differ significantly across 
hierarchical levels; 3) wage increases attached to promotion should be larger for 
Invisibles than Visibles; 4) the result in (3) should be most pronounced in jobs that are 
part of hierarchies characterized by a low degree of task variability across levels.  While 
the first testable implication is also consistent with other theoretical models of 
discrimination in promotions (e.g. Lazear and Rosen 1990 or Athey et al. 2000), the 
others are distinguishing features of our model since they follow from the signaling 
framework combined with the degree to which tasks vary across hierarchical levels.  
Nothing in the models of Lazear and Rosen or Athey et al. should give rise to differences 
in outcomes arising from differences in task variability across hierarchical levels.   
 While our empirical analysis of a single firm focused only on racial differences in 
promotions, our theory could be used in future tests using other datasets to address 
discrimination by gender.  In our empirical analysis, we find clear support for Testable 
Implications 1 and 2 concerning promotion probabilities.  That is, nonwhites have lower 
promotion probabilities than whites, and this racial difference in promotion probabilities 
is mitigated in hierarchies with substantial variability in tasks across levels.  The 
empirical evidence is mixed for the theory’s predictions regarding the wage growth 
attached to promotions.  Testable Implication 3 is supported in that promoted nonwhites 
experience greater wage increases than promoted whites.  But Testable Implication 4 
(that the racial difference in wage growth attached to promotions is mitigated when task 
variability is high) is empirically unsupported.   
There is an omitted feature of our theoretical model that could potentially affect 
the empirical analysis of the previous section, making it difficult to find empirical support 
for our testable implications even if job-assignment signaling of the type we study is 
present in the firm we analyze.  Our model, like most other models of job assignment 
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signaling, does not account for the role of promotions in creating worker incentives to 
exert effort, even though recent empirical evidence suggests that promotion tournaments 
do have incentive effects (e.g. Audas, Barmby, and Treble (2004), DeVaro (2006a, 
2006b)).  The presence of tournament-style incentives from promotions would make the 
implications of our model harder to detect in the data.  The logic for this is based on the 
analysis of Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001), in which the wage spread between job levels 
in a promotion tournament is generated by the signaling role of promotions rather than 
strategically chosen by the employer to elicit the optimal level of worker effort.  Consider 
Testable Implication 1, stating that the employer is less likely to promote Invisibles than 
Visibles with the same pre-promotion job performance.  This effectively handicaps 
Invisibles in the promotion tournament, depressing incentives both for Invisibles (who do 
not exert as much effort since they are unlikely to win) and for Visibles (who do not exert 
as much effort since they are likely to win easily).  From the employer’s perspective, this 
prospect of depressed incentives is an additional cost of under-promoting Invisibles that 
our model ignores, and it should mitigate Testable Implication 1, making it harder to 
identify in the data. 
 Next consider Testable Implication 2, stating that the under-promotion of 
Invisibles occurs to a greater extent when tasks are similar across hierarchical levels.  In 
such job hierarchies, the tradeoff of incentives and optimal assignment that the employer 
faces when making promotion decisions disappears.  That is, the decision that is best 
from an incentives perspective (promoting the worker with the best performance in Job 1) 
is also best from an assignment perspective.  In a job hierarchy with similar tasks across 
hierarchical levels, our Testable Implication 2 states that the employer should be less 
likely to promote an Invisible with a high performance in Job 1.  This failure to promote 
imposes a large cost in terms of incentives.  In contrast, in a hierarchy where tasks are 
very different across levels, the incentives cost of under-promoting high-performing 
Invisibles is lower since the Invisibles with high performances in Job 1 do not necessarily 
expect to be promoted to Job 2 (given that the jobs are totally different).  Thus, the 
presence of incentives should also mitigate Testable Implications 2, 3, and 4, rendering 
them harder to support empirically.  This is a potential reason for the lack of empirical 
support for Testable Implication 4.   
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 To our knowledge, our study is the first to try to measure empirically the degree 
of task variability across levels of a promotional hierarchy.  We think that such a measure 
is potentially useful in a range of applications beyond the particular theory we address in 
this paper.  A number of theoretical models in the promotions literature either explicitly 
incorporate the degree of task variability across hierarchical levels or have predictions 
that should logically vary by this measure.  Thus, our measures should be useful in future 
work that attempts to address other theories with new data.  One example of such a study 
is Ghosh and Waldman (2006).   
Finally, we see our theoretical model as offering a potential explanation for why 
the degree of discrimination in promotions by race or gender might vary by occupation.  
Previous theoretical research on discrimination in the workplace has investigated the 
possible reasons for discrimination and the potential ways in which the problem can be 
eradicated.  An issue that has not been addressed in the literature is the possibility that 
discrimination in promotions may vary across occupations due to inherent differences in 
the degree to which job tasks differ across levels of job hierarchies that exist primarily 
within occupations.  Our analysis suggests that the nature of the job tasks across 
hierarchical levels is potentially important in explaining differences in discrimination 
across occupations.  Some policy implications naturally arise from this.  For example, it 
might be that optimal affirmative action policies should vary by occupation as a result of 
the inherent differences in the task hierarchies across occupations.  The force of such 
policy recommendations obviously rests on corroborating future research using data 
beyond the particular firm in this case study.    
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APPENDIX A 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: We need to prove that η´< η*. Suppose not. That is, suppose η´ > η*. 
Our strategy in proving this lemma will be to show a contradiction in this case. We know 
that η* = )2)((2
)())((2
12
1221
βα
ηηββα
−−
−+−−
cc
ccdd LH
 and η´= (d1-d2)/(c2-c1). If η´> η*, then we 
will get (d1-d2)/(c2-c1) > )2)((2
)())((2
12
1221
βα
ηηββα
−−
−+−−
cc
ccdd LH
.  This simplifies to (d1-d2) > 
c2 ηH – c1 ηL. But from inequality (1) we know that (d1-d2) < c2 ηH – c1 ηH. And since ηH 
> ηL, c2 ηH – c1 ηL > c2 ηH – c1 ηH. Hence (d1-d2) < c2 ηH – c1 ηL, which leads to a 
contradiction. □ 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: We solve this backwards, that is we start from the second 
period. First of all, the employer follows the optimal promotion decision since 
information is perfect. The optimal promotion decision is given by (see page 6 in the 
text): The worker is assigned to job 1 if ηi< η´, and to job 2 if ηi> η´,  where η´ is the 
ability level at which a worker is equally productive at jobs 1 and 2. That is, η´ solves 
d1+c1 ηi = d2+c2 ηi, that is, η´= (d1-d2)/(c2-c1). The outside firms bid β(d2+c2 ηi) if the 
worker is such that ηi> η´ or else β (d1+c1 ηi) if the worker is ηi< η´. It is easy to verify 
than no other wage (either higher or lower than this) can be a best response for an outside 
firm. Now in period 1 the worker’s decision to invest is by the following inequality 
β[d2+c2((ηL+ηH)/2) –{d1+c1((ηH+ηL)/2)}] [{(ηH- η* )/( ηH- ηL)}] > z, 
where he only invests if the gains from investing (the left hand side) is larger than the 
cost ‘z’ of investing. This will hold only if β> β , where β  is given by the solution of the 
equation β[d2+c2((ηL+ηH)/2) –{d1+c1((ηH+ηL)/2)}] [{(ηH- η* )/( ηH- ηL)}] = z.  
We find W1 by imposing a net expected profit of zero condition for the employer 
since firms are perfectly competitive. 
 
W1+ X1 β (d2+c2((ηH+ηL)/2)) + (1-X1) β (d1+c1((ηH+ηL)/2)) = d1+c1((ηL+ηH)/2) + X2α(d2+  
c2((ηH+ηL)/2)) + (1-X1) α (d1+ c1((ηH+ηL)/2)). 
 W1 = d1+c1((ηL+ηH)/2) + X1(α- β) [d2 + c2((ηH+ηL)/2)] +(1-X1) (α- β) [d1 + c1(ηH+ηL)/2)]  
            
Here the left hand side of the above equation (the top equation) gives the expected wages 
that the worker will be paid in his career. Denoting the wage paid in the first period as 
W1, the expected wages in period 2 consists of two components: (1) the wage paid if the 
worker is promoted to job 2 and (2) is the wage paid if the worker is not promoted. The 
respective probabilities are signified with (X1) and (1-X1) respectively. The right hand 
side gives the expected productivity of the worker in the two periods. As in the wages 
paid, this takes into account the respective productivities if the worker is promoted and 
also the case where he is not promoted. The equality of the wages paid over the two 
periods with the productivity of the workers over the same time span is an artifact of the 
net expected zero profit condition of the employer.  □ 
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Proof of Lemma 2:  We present the proof only for the case that is most empirically 
relevant in our study, namely that d2 decreases by enough when c2 is increased so that 
dη´/dc2 > 0.  Proofs for the other cases, in which d2 changes so that dη´/dc2 < 0 or dη´/dc2 
= 0 are available upon request.  From (3) we know that α(d2+c2η*) – β[d2+c2(η*+ηH)/2] = 
α(d1+c1η*) – β[d1+c1(η*+ηL)/2].  The Implicit Function Theorem implies  
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From the fact that η´ = (d1 – d2)/(c2 – c1), we get that 
2
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Substituting this in above we get  
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On simplification this becomes: 
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We define 
)2/(
)(
βα
βα
−
−
= Y < 1.  Hence the above expression can be written as: 
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Since *' ηη <  and 0 < Y < 1, we know 0*]'[)(
1
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−
ηηY
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.  And since 
,0'
2
>
∂
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c
η
 (dη´/dc2 – dη*/dc2) > 0.  □ 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: From Lemma 2 we know that the cut-off ability workers who are 
promoted, η*, varies with c2. We get the cut-off c2 (i.e c*2 ) from equation 3, which gives 
the marginal condition for the workers investing decision in the promotion contract case. 
Note that this is dependent on the costs of investment which is z.  
[d2+c2((η*+ηH)/2) –{d1+c1((η*+ηL)/2)}] [{(ηH- η* )/( ηH- ηL)} – {(ηH- α η* )/( ηH- ηL)}] = 
z 
 Because of the condition on α which ensures that workers are not fired, we know {(ηH- α 
η* )/( ηH- ηL)}=0. We can write the left hand side of the above equation with φ as: 
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φ = β [d2+c2((η*+ηH)/2) -d1+c1((η*+ηL)/2) ] [{(ηH- η* )/( ηH- ηL)}]  
 
Using equation (2´) we can simplify this further to: 
φ = α [d2+c2 η*  -{d1+c1 η*}] [{(ηH- η* )/( ηH- ηL)}]  
or, φ = α [d2 -d1+ (c2 -  c1) η*] [{(ηH- η* )/( ηH- ηL)}]  
 
Differentiating the above expression with respect to c2 we get: 
 
∂φ/∂c2 = [(c2 – c1)α∂η*/∂c2 + αη*].  X1 + [{(-1). ∂η*/∂c2} /  ηH – ηL]. X2 
 
where X1= [{(ηH – η*)/(ηH – ηL)}] and X2 = α[d2 – d1 + (c2 – c1)η*] 
 
We know that ∂η*/∂c2 >0 
So the first term of ∂φ/∂ c2 is zero, and X1 and X2 are positive.     
Thus ∂φ/∂ c2 >0. 
And since φ is a continuous function and φ(c2′) < z < φ(c2′′), we know from the 
Intermediate Value Theorem (IVT) that there exists a c*2 for which (φ(.) – z) is equal to 
zero.  □ 
 
Proof of Testable Implication 3:  
The wages of the marginal Invisible worker who is promoted as against the worker who 
is kept in job 1 is given by, 
wI
P
  = β[d2 + c2(η* + ηH)/2] 
wI
NP
 = β[d1 + c1(η* + ηL)/2] respectively. 
Hence, ξ( 2c ) = wI P – wI NP = β[d2 + c2(η* + ηH)/2] – β[d1 + c1(η* + ηL)/2] 
To show the above we should prove that, 0)(
)(
2
2 <
∂
∂
c
cξ
. 
Since we know that (d1 + c1η´) = (d2 + c2η´), by substituting for d2 in the above equation 
we can simplify to,  
ξ( 2c ) =  β[d1 + (c1 – c2) η´+ c2(η* + ηH)/2 – d1 – c1(η* + ηL)/2].  
By partially differentiating the above and then simplifying with respect to c2 we get: 
=
∂
∂
)(
)(
2
2
c
cξ [- η´+ (ηH/2)]. 
By substituting for η´ we can further simplify the above to get )(
)(
2
2
c
c
∂
∂ξ
= (c2 – c1 + 2∆)26, 
which we know from assumption (1), as negative.  Hence .0)(
)(
2
2 <
∂
∂
c
cξ
 □ 
 
  
                                                 
26
 Where ∆ = ( d1 – d2)/ηH.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
Occupation codes for the workers in the dataset were derived primarily using 
information on job titles.  First, the job titles in the personnel records were compared to 
the (searchable) Census 2000 alphabetical list of occupations 
(http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/ioindex/occ_a.html).  We searched for the closest 
possible title.  When there was no comparable title listed in the occupation codes, we 
looked on www.google.com for the job title to determine what the job might entail and 
then looked for an appropriate occupation code accordingly.   
Frequently, the job title included an acronym, such as “QA technician” or “AP 
clerk”—in such cases, we searched for possible acronyms from 
www.acronymfinder.com, and used our best estimate of which one fit our data.  In many 
cases, there were multiple possible occupation codes that could fit the job title.  In these 
instances, we made use of the secondary job title variable, function/skill, to determine 
what broad occupation category the worker belonged in—such as finance, manufacturing, 
engineering, etc. and then narrowed down the occupation codes accordingly.  
Additionally, as a last resort, the wage information was used—in the sense that we 
expected that a high wage or an annually-paid salary indicated a more white collar job, a 
monthly-paid salary indicated a technical or clerical job, and a low-paying or hourly-paid 
wage indicated a manufacturing job.  Some job titles could not be coded.  The majority of 
these were internships, trainees, co-ops, temps and contractors. 
Since the NCS data are coded according to the 1990 Census occupation codes, it 
was necessary to convert to those categories.  We used a table showing the redistribution 
of the 1990 Census occupation into the new 2000 categories, we then assigned a 1990 
occupation code, using the code with the highest conversion percentage.  For example, 
although three 1990 occupation codes convert into the 2000 occupation code 570 
(secretaries and administrative assistants), including 303 (general office supervisors), 313 
(secretaries), and 336 (records clerks), the majority of them converted to 313, so we 
would use that code to categorize all secretary jobs. 
In practice, job hierarchies exist both within and across occupations.  An example 
of a within-occupation job hierarchy is assistant professor  associate professor  full 
professor, whereas an example of a hierarchy defined across occupations might be 
computer programmer  general manager.  Thus, promotions sometimes involve 
changes in occupation, though most frequently promotions do not involve a change in 
occupation (especially within the same establishment).  In our data, using two-digit 
(three-digit) occupation codes, only 6.7 (7.9) percent of promotions involve a change in 
occupation.  We note that although only a small fraction of promotions cross occupations, 
these naturally entail greater task variability across hierarchical levels than do within-
occupation promotions.  Using two-digit occupations, the following table displays the 
1148 transitions involving positive level changes (i.e. promotions).   
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Table B1 Two-Digit Occupational Transitions Resulting from Promotions 
Number Occupation Before Occupation After 
   
105 Executive Executive 
2 Mgmt related Executive 
1 Math/Computer Science Executive 
1 Records Executive 
1 Mechanic Executive 
53 Mgmt related Mgmt related 
42 Engineers Engineers 
1 Other precision worker Engineers 
23 Math/Computer Science Math/Computer Science 
19 Natural sciences Natural sciences 
10 Other Professional Other Professional 
1 Health Technician Other Professional 
1 Health Technician Health Technician 
38 Engineering Technician Engineering Technician 
20 Other Technician Other Technician 
3 Sales Mgr Sales Mgr 
1 Sales-Finance/Business Sales-Finance/Business 
1 Exec Sales Rep 
108 Sales Rep Sales Rep 
1 Records Sales Rep 
1 Other Sales Other Sales 
2 Exec Administrative Supervisor 
9 Administrative Supervisor Administrative Supervisor 
1 Secretary Administrative Supervisor 
2 Mechanic Administrative Supervisor 
8 Computer Operator Computer Operator 
1 Mechanic Computer Operator 
15 Secretary Secretary 
51 Records Records 
4 Other Administrative Records 
1 MachineOp Records 
1 Assembler Records 
1 Records Other Administrative 
142 Other Administrative Other Administrative 
1 Machine Operator Other Administrative 
2 Handlers Other Administrative 
2 Other Laborer Other Administrative 
1 Protective Service Protective Service 
2 Building Service Building Service 
142 Mechanic Mechanic 
3 Other Administrative Other precision worker 
128 OtherPrec Other precision worker 
4 Assembler Other precision worker 
2 Handlers Other precision worker 
4 Other precision worker Machine Operator 
58 Machine Operator Machine Operator 
8 Assembler Machine Operator 
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1 Handlers Machine Operator 
1 Building Service Assembler 
1 Other precision worker Assembler 
1 Machine Operator Assembler 
40 Assembler Assembler 
1 Handlers Assembler 
1 Other Laborer Assembler 
2 Vehicle Operator Vehicle Operator 
1 Other Administrative Other Transportation 
3 Other Transportation Other Transportation 
1 Mgmt related Handlers 
1 Secretary Handlers 
1 Other Administrative Handlers 
1 Building Service Handlers 
3 Other precision worker Handlers 
3 Machine Operator Handlers 
13 Assembler Handlers 
38 Handlers Handlers 
1 Assembler Other Laborer 
6 Other Laborer Other Laborer 
 
Total:  1148   (93.3% of promotions are within-occupation) 
   
 45 
Table 1: Previous Literature on Racial Differences in Promotions 
Paper Occupation Data Set Promotion Rates Wage 
Changes 
Anandarajan 
(2002) 
Auditors Questionnaire; 
644 
observations 
No difference in 
promotion (to manager) 
rates of whites and non-
whites 
N.A. 
Baldwin 
(1996) 
U.S. Army 
Officers 
Request made 
to Army; 1980-
1993; 123,000 
observations 
Blacks, Hispanics, 
Asian/Pacific Islanders, 
and Native Americans 
had lower promotion 
rates than non-Hispanic 
whites to ranks of 
Captain, Major, and Lt. 
Colonel, but for Colonel 
Hispanics had lower and 
Asian/Pacific Islander 
higher rates 
N.A. 
Bellemore 
(2001) 
Professional 
Baseball 
Author’s 
creation; 1968-
9, 1976-7, 
1991-7; 1,743 
observations 
Promotion rates to major 
league are 5.2% less 
likely for blacks, 5.4% 
less likely for Hispanics  
N.A. 
Killingsworth 
and Reimers 
(1983) 
Civilian 
Employees, US 
Army Base 
DoD Civilian 
Personnel 
Information 
System; 1975-
8; 16,045 
observations 
Non-whites less likely to 
be promoted 
Non-whites 
receive less 
compensation 
after 
promotion 
Landau (1995) Managerial and 
professional 
employees at a 
Fortune 500 
company 
Questionnaire; 
no years given; 
1268 
observations 
Managers rated 
“promotion potential” 
lower for blacks and 
Asians, but not Hispanics 
N.A. 
Mellor and 
Paulin (1995) 
Employees in 
two branches 
of a financial 
services firm 
Company data; 
1988-90; 
approx. 1025 
observations 
N.A. Return to 
promotions is 
not higher for 
whites than 
non-whites 
Paulin and 
Mellor (1996) 
Employees at 
the home office 
of a medium-
sized financial 
firm 
Company data; 
1988-90; 575 
observations 
Promotion rate for non-
white males is 17% 
below white males, but 
no difference for non-
white females relative to 
white males;  also, 
gender/race composition 
of occupations sometimes 
affects promotion rates 
N.A. 
Pergamit and 
Veum (1999) 
Private-sector 
workers not 
National 
Longitudinal 
Black men 1.7% less 
likely to be promoted 
N.A. 
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self-employed 
and working 
>= 30 hours per 
week; all 25-33 
years old in 
1990 
Survey of 
Youth; 1990; 
approx. 3,355 
observations 
than white men, Hispanic 
men 10.1% less likely 
Powell and 
Butterfield 
(1997) 
Management in 
a cabinet-level 
federal 
department 
Promotion 
files; 1987-
1994; 300 
observations 
There were not racial 
differences in promotion 
rates;  however, non-
whites were less likely to 
be  already employed in 
the department studied 
and on average had more 
job experience, both of 
which decreased a 
candidate’s chances of 
receiving promotion 
N.A. 
Pudney and 
Shields 
(2000a) 
Nurses in the 
UK’s National 
Health Service 
Survey 
conducted by 
Department of 
Health; 1994; 
8,919 
observations 
Non-whites had 
significant disadvantage 
in speed of promotion 
N.A. 
Pudney and 
Shields 
(2000b) 
Nurses in the 
UK’s National 
Health Service 
Survey 
conducted by 
Department of 
Health; 1994; 
8,919 
observations 
Non-whites had 
significant disadvantage 
in speed of promotion 
N.A. 
Stewart and 
Firestone 
(1992) 
U.S. Military 
Officers 
DoD 
tabulation; 
1979-88;  
It is difficult to predict 
promotion rates for 
various specifications of 
the model.; thus it cannot 
be concluded that there 
are racial differences in 
promotion. 
N.A. 
Sundstrom 
(1990) 
Railroadmen in 
the American 
South 
U.S. Census; 
1910 
Blacks were not 
promoted beyond mid-
level positions; difference 
in promotability helped 
create wage disparities 
between whites and 
blacks in same positions. 
N.A. 
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Table 2a: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean No. Obs. 
Promotion 0.010 121760 
Nonwhite 0.305 121760 
Female 0.512 121760 
Age 31.11 121760 
Tenure (months) 13.85 121760 
Level tenure (months) 11.03 121760 
Married 0.508 121760 
Part-time 0.098 121579 
< BA 0.212 47956 
BA 0.616 47956 
> BA 0.173 47956 
Performance 1 0.129 56164 
Performance 2 0.639 56164 
Performance 3 0.224 56164 
Performance 4 0.008 56164 
Coefficient of skill variation (3 digit) 0.364 113058 
Coefficient of skill variation (2 digit) 0.405 113122 
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Table 2b: Promotion Probabilities by Worker Characteristics 
 Probability of Promotion 
Nonwhite 0.009 
White 0.010 
Female 0.010 
Male 0.010 
Age<25 0.010 
Age 25-34 0.011 
Age 35-44 0.009 
Age 45-54 0.005 
Age 55+ 0.003 
Tenure <1 year 0.008 
Tenure 1 year - <2 year 0.012 
Tenure >2 years 0.011 
Level tenure <1 year 0.009 
Level tenure 1 year - <2year 0.013 
Level tenure >2 years 0.009 
Married 0.009 
Unmarried 0.010 
Part-time 0.008 
Full-time 0.010 
<BA 0.007 
BA 0.013 
>BA 0.012 
Performance 1 0.003 
Performance 2 0.009 
Performance 3 0.014 
Performance 4 0.021 
Manager  0.015 
Professional 0.010 
Technical 0.010 
Sales 0.011 
Clerical 0.008 
Service 0.004 
Precision Crafts 0.025 
Machine operator/assembler 0.005 
Handler/other laborer 0.010 
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TABLE 3:  Promotion Probability Probits for Testable Implication 1 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
Nonwhite -0.075*** 
(0.0242) 
-0.074*** 
(0.024) 
-0.064* 
(0.042) 
-0.059* 
(0.039) 
-0.091* 
(0.055) 
Female  0.019 
(0.022) 
0.030 
(0.034) 
-0.015 
(0.033) 
-0.013 
(0.044) 
Age  0.033*** 
(0.009) 
-0.011 
(0.017) 
0.022 
(0.016) 
0.012 
(0.026) 
Age2/10  -0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
Tenure  0.0162*** 
(0.006) 
0.016** 
(0.008) 
-0.013 
(0.010) 
-0.015 
(0.013) 
Tenure2/10  -0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003** 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
Level tenure  0.018*** 
(0.006) 
0.048*** 
(0.009) 
0.063*** 
(0.011) 
0.099*** 
(0.014) 
Level tenure2/10  -0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.013*** 
(0.002) 
-0.020*** 
(0.003) 
Married  -0.024 
(0.023) 
0.011 
(0.036) 
-0.054 
(0.034) 
-0.045 
(0.045) 
Part-time  -0.015 
(0.039) 
-0.437*** 
(0.139) 
-0.105 
(0.106) 
-0.413* 
(0.250) 
< BA   -0.177*** 
(0.059) 
 -0.307*** 
(0.082) 
BA   -0.034 
(0.045) 
 -0.055 
(0.055) 
Performance 1    -0.689*** 
(0.156) 
-0.554** 
(0.253) 
Performance 2    -0.366*** 
(0.142) 
-0.218 
(0.238) 
Performance 3    -0.174 
(0.144) 
0.031 
(0.240) 
Constant -2.312*** 
(0.013) 
-2.941*** 
(0.154) 
-2.285*** 
(0.296) 
-2.533*** 
(0.308) 
-2.597*** 
(0.531) 
No. obs. 121,759 121,578 47,913 56,217 30,929 
Pseudo-R2 0.001 0.013 0.038 0.035 0.068 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by 
***, **, and *, respectively, using one-tailed tests for Nonwhite and two-tailed tests for all other 
coefficients.   
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Table 4:  Promotion Probability Probits for Testable Implication 2 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Nonwhite -0.340** 
(0.155) 
-0.348** 
(0.161) 
-0.248** 
(0.118) 
-0.250** 
(0.119) 
Coefficient of Variation (3-digit 
occupations) 
-1.720*** 
(0.201) 
-1.968*** 
(0.220) 
-3.529*** 
(0.400) 
-4.087*** 
(0.426) 
(Coefficient of Variation)2 (3-
digit occupations) 
  2.518*** 
(0.436) 
2.945*** 
(0.452) 
CV (3 digit) × Nonwhite 0.757** 
(0.433) 
0.776** 
(0.452) 
0.507* 
(0.324) 
0.510* 
(0.326) 
Female  0.090*** 
(0.027) 
 0.090*** 
(0.027) 
Age  0.015 
(0.011) 
 0.014 
(0.011) 
Age2  -0.000** 
(0.000) 
 -0.000** 
(0.000) 
Tenure  0.015** 
(0.007) 
 0.015** 
(0.007) 
Tenure2  -0.000** 
(0.000) 
 -0.000** 
(0.000) 
Level tenure  0.019** 
(0.008) 
 0.020** 
(0.007) 
(Level tenure)2  -0.000** 
(0.000) 
 -0.000** 
(0.000) 
Married  -0.052* 
(0.028) 
 -0.056** 
(0.028) 
Part time  0.182*** 
(0.050) 
 0.178*** 
(0.050) 
Constant -1.705*** 
(0.068) 
-1.954*** 
(0.206) 
-1.402*** 
(0.089) 
-1.586*** 
(0.217) 
No. obs. 82,230 82,106 82,230 82,106 
Pseudo-R2 0.013 0.028 0.015 0.030 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by 
***, **, and *, respectively, using one-tailed tests for Nonwhite, Coefficient of Variation (3 digit), and the 
interaction of these two variables, and two-tailed tests for all other coefficients.   
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TABLE 5:  OLS Wage Growth Regressions for Testable Implication 3 
Dependent Variable = ln(wageit) – ln(wagei,t-1) 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
Promotion 0.088*** 
(0.006) 
0.088*** 
(0.006) 
0.083*** 
(0.010) 
0.078*** 
(0.009) 
0.079*** 
(0.012) 
Nonwhite 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Promotion × 
Nonwhite 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.019) 
0.014 
(0.015) 
0.010 
(0.026) 
Female  -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Age  -0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
Age2/10  0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Tenure  -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Tenure2/10  -0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Level tenure  -0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Level tenure2/10  0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Married  0.001** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Part-time  -0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
< BA   -0.001 
(0.001) 
 -0.000 
(0.001) 
BA   -0.001 
(0.001) 
 -0.000 
(0.000) 
Performance 1    -0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Performance 2    -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Performance 3    -0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
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Constant 0.005*** 
(0.000) 
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.018*** 
(0.002) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
No. obs. 112,924 112,924 45,156 53,988 29,738 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by 
***, **, and *, respectively, using one-tailed tests for Promotion, Nonwhite, and the interaction of these 
two variables, and two-tailed tests for all other coefficients.   
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Table 6:  OLS Wage Growth Regressions for Testable Implication 4 
Dependent Variable = ln(wageit) – ln(wagei,t-1) 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Promotion 0.138*** 
(0.021) 
-0.137*** 
(0.021) 
0.139*** 
(0.021) 
0.138*** 
(0.021) 
Nonwhite 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Promotion × Nonwhite 
-0.032 
(0.033) 
-0.031 
(0.033) 
-0.032 
(0.033) 
-0.031 
(0.033) 
Coefficient of Variation (3-digit 
occupations) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.017*** 
(0.005) 
Promotion × Coefficient of 
Variation (3-digit occupations) 
-0.143** 
(0.058) 
-0.139** 
(0.057) 
-0.147** 
(0.058) 
-0.142** 
(0.058) 
CV (3 digit) × Nonwhite 0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
CV (3 digit) × Nonwhite × 
Promotion 
0.115 
(0.088) 
0.113 
(0.088) 
0.116 
(0.088) 
0.114 
(0.088) 
(Coefficient of Variation)2 (3-digit 
occupations) 
  -0.021*** 
(0.005) 
-0.021*** 
(0.005) 
Female  -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Age  -0.000 
(0.000) 
 -0.000 
(0.000) 
Age2  0.000 
(0.000) 
 0.000 
(0.000) 
Tenure  -0.000 
(0.000) 
 -0.000 
(0.000) 
Tenure2  0.000 
(0.000) 
 -0.000 
(0.000) 
Level tenure  -0.000*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.000*** 
(0.000) 
(Level tenure)2  0.000*** 
(0.000) 
 0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Married  0.000 
(0.000) 
 0.000 
(0.000) 
Part time  -0.000 
(0.001) 
 -0.000 
(0.001) 
Constant 0.006*** 0.014*** 0.002* 0.010*** 
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(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
No. obs. 76,784 76,784 76,784 76,784 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by 
***, **, and *, respectively, using one-tailed tests for Nonwhite, Coefficient of Variation (3 digit), and the 
interaction of these two variables, and two-tailed tests for all other coefficients.   
 
